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In the lead-up to the Australian Federal Election 
in September 2013, public attention focused 
dramatically on Papua New Guinea (PNG) in terms 
of the joint PNG–Australia Regional Resettlement 
Arrangement, the subject of a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) signed on 6 August 2013 
(DFAT 2013a). In short, Australia would transfer 
asylum seekers who arrived in Australia by boat 
after 19 July 2013 to PNG where their claim for 
refugee status would be assessed, under PNG law, 
and those found to be refugees would be resettled 
in PNG ‘and in any other participating regional, 
including Pacific Island, states’ (DFAT 2013b). 
(Nauru is the only other current participating 
regional state, with Cambodia considering 
resettlement of asylum seekers at the time of 
publication (AAP 2014).) While the Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and 
Other Measures) Act 20122 provided for assessment 
of asylum seekers by PNG, it was the August 2013 
Regional Resettlement Arrangement (mentioned 
as the 2013 Arrangement) that provided for 
resettlement in PNG, of asylum seekers determined 
to be refugees. In accordance with the 2013 
Arrangement, the full cost of implementing the 
arrangement in PNG, that is, transfer, assessment, 
and resettlement, would be met by Australia.
PNG has a track record related to the 
assessment and resettlement of asylum seekers. 
The discussion paper begins with a brief outline 
of PNG policy responses to West Papuan asylum 
seekers from neighbouring Indonesian Papua. It 
focuses on the permissive residence system (part 
of a PNG ‘Limited Integration’ policy) offered 
to West Papuan refugees living at the former 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) resettlement site at East Awin in 
Western Province since 1997. Limitations of the 
permissive residence permit, particularly issues 
related to eligibility and permit renewal, illustrate 
challenges faced by the PNG government and 
bureaucracy to design and administer a visa system. 
PNG’s track record of assessing and resettling West 
Papuan asylum seekers since 1984 is looked at 
against the terms of the 2013 Arrangement, which 
requires PNG to determine the refugee status of 
asylum seekers transferred by Australia to the 
offshore processing centre on Manus Island, review 
negative determinations, and resettle in PNG those 
determined to be refugees.
The second section considers PNG’s obligations 
under the terms of the 2013 Arrangement. In 
relation to status determination, an efficient and 
procedurally fair determination process requires 
legislation i.e., domestic refugee law, and an 
effective immigration bureaucracy. It can be argued 
that neither of these elements were present at the 
time of the 2013 Arrangement. However, at the 
time of publication of this paper in mid-2014, 
some status determinations and a review process 
had been announced. In relation to resettlement, 
ongoing disagreement by the PNG government 
over the terms of resettlement (which refugees 
are to be resettled, how many refugees will be 
resettled) threatens to undermine the terms of the 
2013 Arrangement. Australia has underwritten 
the costs of implementing resettlement under 
the Arrangement, although the details are not 
explicit. Nor are details available about any social 
planning being undertaken for 
the resettlement of refugees. The 
author takes up UNHCR’s charge 
of a ‘xenophobic phenomenon’ in 
relation to the reception of non-
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Melanesian refugees in PNG, and offers some 
context. It is argued that social planning that works 
towards minimising inter-community tension is 
critical to resettlement.
The 2013 Arrangement is subject to annual 
review by the Australian–PNG Ministerial Forum. 
The sustainability of the Arrangement in terms of 
legal challenges3 and security issues is the subject of 
the third section. Responding to the announcement 
of the first status determination decisions at the 
time of publication of this paper, the conclusion 
summarises some of the major issues related to 
PNG’s responsibilities under the Arrangement: 
procedurally fair assessment and review processes, 
and resettlement planning.
PNG’s track record on West Papuan refugees
Several related events in Papua generated the 
phenomenon of West Papuans seeking asylum 
in neighbouring PNG. Arguably, the catalyst was 
the 1961 United Nations-brokered transitional 
arrangement (UNTEA) that ceded Netherlands 
New Guinea to Indonesia, followed by the 1969 
referendum, commonly glossed as the Act of Free 
Choice, which resulted in a declaration of (then) 
West Irian as Indonesia’s seventeenth province.4
In the 1960s, West Papuans moving eastwards 
across the border were classified by the Territory 
Administration as traditional ‘border crossers’.5 The 
Migration Ordinance of 1963 contained no clear 
provisions for dealing with non-traditional border 
crossers and assessment of their status was at the 
colonial administrator’s discretion. By determining 
asylum applications individually, the Australian, 
and later, PNG administrations, in effect masked 
the political nature of the movement (Blaskett 
1989). Generally speaking, the PNG Government 
preferred to categorise West Papuans as border 
crossers rather than refugees. This avoided 
predetermining their status, and encouraged 
repatriation as the most appropriate response. 
In 1968 some West Papuans granted temporary 
permissive residence permits were relocated away 
from the international border to a ‘camp’ on Manus 
Island established by the Territory of Papua New 
Guinea administration (May 1986; Neumann and 
Taylor 2010).
It was not until the influx of 11,000 West 
Papuans from February 1984 that the question 
of status became a sensitive topic for the PNG 
national cabinet and press. It is important to 
note that this figure included 9435 Muyu whose 
traditional land straddles the international border 
and who share language and kin relations with 
Yonggom customary landowning groups in PNG 
(Kirsch 1989, 1996). It was argued that those who 
had crossed en masse could not be categorised 
according to the technical term border crosser, as 
their movement was not temporary in character or 
for the purpose of traditional activities.
The PNG Cabinet agreed on 17 July 1986 
to accede to the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.6 PNG 
made seven ‘reservations’ (or exclusions) to the 
1951 Convention:7 Article 17(1) [Wage-earning 
employment], Article 21 [Housing], Article 22(1) 
[Same treatment as nationals in the provision of 
elementary education], Article 26 [Freedom of 
Movement within the Territory of PNG], Article 
31 [Non-imposition of penalties for illegal entry or 
presence], Article 32 [Prohibition against expulsion 
of refugees], and Article 34 [Favourable treatment 
in citizenship processing including reduction of 
relevant fees] (ICJ-RCOA 2003). These reservations 
reflected the government’s reported concern that 
it did not have the economic capacity to grant 
refugees the same social assistance as PNG citizens 
(UNHCR 2013a). The UNHCR determined the 
status of those who had crossed to be refugees 
prima facie, that is, due to their mass movement 
as a result of generalised conflict, and the PNG 
Government and UNHCR subsequently relocated 
some 3500 West Papuans from 17 informal camps 
along the international border to East Awin in 
Western Province.8
In 1996, the PNG Government announced 
a ‘Limited Integration’ policy that encouraged 
integration through permissive residency if West 
Papuan refugees wished to remain in PNG, and 
for those who did not wish to integrate, the policy 
supported voluntary repatriation to the Indonesian 
Province of Papua (UNHCR 2010). Under PNG’s 
1978 Migration Act, permissive residency status 
could be accorded to refugees for renewable periods 
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of three years, subject to eight conditions. One 
requirement not listed but reportedly regulated is 
the requirement for refugees to be resident at East 
Awin in the six months prior to application (ICJ-
RCOA 2003). The eight main conditions are:
1. To abide by the laws of PNG
2. Not to engage directly or indirectly in any 
political activity that might affect the good 
relationship between the governments of PNG 
and Indonesia
3. Not to reside in the border areas of West Sepik 
and Western provinces except East Awin camp
4. Not to engage directly or indirectly in OPM 
activities including holding of military and civil 
positions in the organisation
5. Not to hold executive positions nor be financial 
members of any political parties in PNG
6. Not to vote or stand in national, provincial 
and local government elections in PNG until 
attainment of citizenship
7. To notify the appropriate authority of any 
change of address and place of residence in 
PNG
8. Permits are subject to renewal annually.
Permissive residents would have the following 
rights:
1. Free movement within PNG except to and in 
border areas
2. Engagement in business activities including 
leasing of government land and access to 
banking facilities
3. Employment with similar conditions as 
nationals
4. Enrolment in PNG schools and tertiary 
institutions
5. Access to health services and facilities
6. Access to PNG courts
7. Freedom of worship
8. Freedom of marriage
9. Eligibility for naturalisation after eight years 
qualifying period as permissive residents
10. Freedom to return to Indonesia again to take 
up permanent residency at own expense (ICJ-
RCOA 2003:42–3).
An international campaign lobbying the PNG 
Government to offer permissive residency to West 
Papuan refugees claimed that permissive residency 
would mitigate the impact of the government’s 
reservations to Article 26 of the 1951 Convention, 
by permitting freedom of movement within PNG. 
Freedom of movement allowed by permissive 
residency, albeit away from the border, was 
viewed optimistically by West Papuan refugees, as 
relocation to other regions would offer economic 
opportunity as well as maintenance of kin relations 
(Glazebrook 2008).
Significantly, the first batch of permissive 
residency applications was intercepted and seized 
by members of the customary landowner groups 
of the East Awin site, who may have feared 
two consequences arising from the granting of 
permissive residency: first, this status allowed 
resettlement elsewhere in PNG which could relieve 
the government of its obligation to compensate 
customary landowner groups for use of their 
land, and second, all West Papuan applicants were 
required to be resident at East Awin for a period of 
six months, further depleting natural resources in 
the settlement site and surrounds.
Problems with renewal of permissive residency 
permits threatened to undermine the system. 
These problems illustrate challenges experienced 
by cabinet and the immigration bureaucracy in 
designing and administering a visa system for 
non-nationals. In 2003, the Citizenship Advisory 
Committee instituted under PNG Constitution 
Articles 75 and 76 had not met for eight years due 
to the absence of funds allocated for its operation, 
and two permanent members of parliament had yet 
to be appointed (ICJ-RCOA 2003). A joint mission 
of the International Commission of Jurists and 
Refugee Council of Australia reported that: ‘While 
75 percent of the camp residents had been granted 
Permissive Residence, the three-year permits have 
expired and they have not been renewed. Those 
who did not receive permissive residence were given 
no indication as to why this decision was made. The 
status of all camp residents is therefore unclear.’ The 
mission recommended that renewal of permissive 
residency permits be automatic if conditions had 
been met by the applicant. Few West Papuans 
living outside East Awin had been able to fulfil the 
seemingly gratuitous and disruptive requirements 
of permissive residency, particularly living at East 
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Awin for six months, and returning after three 
years for a further six months to satisfy permit 
renewal requirements (ICJ-RCOA 2003).
Integration of West Papuans at East Awin at 
least, is being planned for on several fronts.9 One 
clarification is timely here: while this section 
focuses on West Papuan refugees at East Awin, 
PNG hosts some 6000 other West Papuans, either 
refugees or living in a refugee-like situation 
(UNHCR 2013c). At the time of publication of 
this paper, permissive residency applications from 
West Papuans resident at East Awin were being 
processed by the PNG Department of Provincial 
and Local Level Government Affairs (DPLLGA), 
and field visits to East Awin and the border region 
had been conducted in 2012 by DPLLGA officers 
for the purposes of permit renewal. The eligibility 
requirement that applicants be resident at East 
Awin for six months is reportedly unchanged, 
however. Second, planning is being undertaken 
for the former UNHCR relocation site at East 
Awin to be incorporated into the North Fly district 
by the next local government elections in 2017, 
allowing participation in council elections by West 
Papuans resident at East Awin. The implications 
of this incorporation for West Papuans is a subject 
for further research. The third point relates to the 
current routine practice of PNG birth certificates 
issued to children born at East Awin. Ratification 
of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, which requires nationality to be 
granted to persons born in the state who would 
otherwise be stateless, would ensure this practice 
is not vulnerable to domestic politics. Ratification 
would also extend these rights of citizenship to the 
children of West Papuans born elsewhere in PNG.
The final point relates to PNG Foreign 
Affairs and Immigration Minister, Rimbink 
Pato’s speech to parliament on 18 September 
2013 that disclosed that the government was 
‘taking active steps to regularise the status of 
other long-term refugee groups in PNG. This will 
include removal of the citizenship application fee 
[PGK10,000=AUD3909]10 for refugees to assist 
with their full integration within PNG society’ 
(MFAI 2013). West Papuans holding permissive 
residency permits are entitled to apply for PNG 
citizenship after eight years of legal residency 
and fulfilment of other criteria in section 67(2) 
of the constitution. Should Minister Pato act 
upon his publicly stated intention, the ambiguity 
over the legal status of West Papuans in PNG 
could be resolved, providing opportunity for 
genuine resettlement.
By way of summary, PNG’s recognition of West 
Papuan asylum seekers prima facie as refugees 
did not require processes of status determination 
or review of negative decisions to be established 
by the government. Neither was human resource 
capacity of the kind required to forensically 
investigate the individual cases of asylum seekers 
from the Middle East and South Asia ever neeeded. 
Significantly, the design and administration of the 
visa system (permissive residency permits) for 
West Papuan refugees reflects on the capacity of 
cabinet and the immigration bureaucracy. Several 
factors have impeded West Papuan resettlement 
in PNG in economic and political terms. These 
include: reservations (or exclusions) made by PNG 
to the 1951 Convention, and problems of access to 
citizenship. Social acceptance of West Papuans, who 
are fellow Melanesians, has been taken for granted, 
and has not been the subject of planning.
This track record is now held up against PNG’s 
obligations under the terms of the 2013 Arrange-
ment in the section below. First, however, a brief 
background to the 2013 Arrangement is elaborated.
Background to the 2013 Arrangement
PNG has hosted an offshore processing centre for 
Australia on Manus Island between 2001 and 2008, 
and since 2012. In 2001, the Federal Government 
introduced legislation glossed as the ‘Pacific 
Solution’, which excised Christmas Island, Ashmore 
and Cartier Islands, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands 
from the Australian migration zone. Arriving at an 
‘excised offshore place’ meant that asylum seekers 
were processed under a different system and had 
different rights to arrivals at non-excised places. 
The new Act allowed for intercepted asylum seekers 
to be removed offshore, transferred to Manus Island 
(PNG) or Nauru, or forcibly returned to Indonesia 
from where they could apply to enter Australia. 
Australia signed an MOU with PNG in October 
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2001, allowing construction of a processing centre 
to accommodate and assess the claims of asylum 
seekers on Manus Island, with management by 
the International Organization for Migration.11 
Claims were to be processed by Australian 
immigration officials, but not under Australian law, 
and claimants had no access to legal assistance or 
judicial review. The incoming Rudd Government 
abolished the Pacific Solution, announcing in 
February 2008 that the centres on Manus and 
Nauru would no longer be used, and that future 
‘unauthorised boat arrivals’ would be processed 
on Christmas Island, which would remain excised 
from Australia’s migration zone.
During the Rudd and Gillard Australian Labor 
Party governments (2009–2012) around 19,000 
people in 338 boats arrived (Phillips and Spinks 
2011). More than 1500 asylum seekers were 
recorded as drowning at sea since 1998 (Hutton 
2013). A domestic political discourse saw the 
Opposition Coalition under Tony Abbot criticising 
government policy for this steady and increasing 
flow of asylum seekers, in part, blaming the Rudd 
Government’s closure of off-shore processing on 
Manus and Nauru.
On 14 August 2012, the Australian Parliament 
introduced legislation, the Regional Processing 
Act, to allow offshore processing of asylum seekers 
in Nauru and PNG. On 16 May 2013, legislation 
was passed which extended the excision policy to 
the Australian mainland. Asylum seekers arriving 
by boat anywhere in Australia were no longer able 
to lodge a valid protection claim except at the 
discretion of the Minister for Immigration, and 
would be at risk of being transferred offshore for 
processing. Previously, the excision policy applied 
only to excised offshore places, such as Christmas 
Island. The Regional Processing Act paved the 
way for the 2013 Arrangement signed by prime 
ministers Rudd and O’Neill on 6 August 2013.
In summary, under the 2013 Regional 
Resettlement Arrangement (DFAT 2013a, 2013b) 
‘any unauthorized maritime arrival entering 
Australian waters will be liable for transfer to 
Papua New Guinea (in the first instance, Manus 
Island) for processing and resettlement in Papua 
New Guinea and in any other participating 
regional, including Pacific Island, states.’ In relation 
to refugee status determination, specifically,
The Government of Papua New Guinea 
assures the Government of Australia that it 
will: … b. make an assessment, or permit an 
assessment to be made, of whether or not 
a Transferee is covered by the definition of 
refugee in Article 1A of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended 
by the 1967 Protocol Related to the Status 
of Refugees
whereupon, those whom it determines to be 
refugees will be enabled to settle in PNG.
The following sections outline PNG’s 
responsibilities under the 2013 Arrangement related 
to status determination and review of negative 
decisions, and resettlement.
PNG’s Obligations under the Arrangement
Determining Refugee Status under PNG Law
The particular procedure for determining a person’s 
status as refugee is not prescribed by the 1951 
Convention, except to say that any procedure 
should be ‘fair and efficient’ (UNHCR 2011). 
Separate from the 1951 Convention, UNHCR 
(2011) has defined a fair and efficient procedure as 
requiring ‘that States designate a central authority 
with the relevant knowledge and expertise to 
assess applications, ensure procedural safeguards 
are available at all stages of the process and permit 
appeals or reviews of initial decisions.’
The UNHCR began work with the PNG 
Government in 2002 to develop refugee legislation, 
drafting a refugee law Act which was subsequently 
abandoned in favour of a simplified model 
developed by the Pacific Immigration Directors 
Conference as an annex to the amended Migration 
Act 2005 (UNHCR 2007). At a 2010 roundtable on 
legal and practical challenges faced in addressing 
the protection of non-Melanesian asylum seekers 
and refugees in PNG, a working group was formed 
to review PNG domestic legislation and consider 
how the 1951 Convention can be implemented 
(UNHCR 2010). At the time of the 2013 
Arrangement, while much of the groundwork for 
developing refugee legislation for PNG had been 
done, codification had yet to take place.
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Under the 2013 Arrangement, PNG is 
responsible for carrying out refugee status 
determination to be managed and administered 
by PNG, under domestic law, with support from 
Australia. Several provisions of the PNG Migration 
Act and Regulation are inconsistent with PNG’s 
commitments under the 1951 Convention. The 
UNHCR (2013a) advised amending the PNG 
Migration Act and Regulation governing the status 
determination of asylum seekers; specifically, the 
detailing of asylum processes and procedures 
in PNG. For example, asylum seekers should be 
informed about their legal rights and entitlements, 
as well as the procedures to be followed to assess 
their claims for refugee status including the legal 
basis, the decision-making authority, and the 
indicative time frames for these various steps, as 
well as an independent merit review process.
Legislation is one matter, expertise to 
determine status is another. In a letter dated 
9 October 2012, the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, Mr Antonio Guterres, advised 
the Australian Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship, Chris Bowen, that the immigration 
bureaucracy in PNG did not have sufficient 
capacity to undertake refugee status determination 
under the Refugee Convention (UNHCR 2012):
There are currently no immigration officers 
with the experience, skill or expertise to 
undertake Refugee Status Determination 
under the Refugee Convention. Since 2008, 
in the absence of any national capacity in this 
regard, UNHCR has been obliged to exercise 
its mandate to determine asylum seekers’ 
need for protection and to find solutions 
through resettlement. We recognise that 
efforts are presently being made to identify 
and train a small cadre of officers in asylum 
and refugee issues. Over time, capacity 
will improve but, depending on the scale 
and complexity of the task of processing 
cases and protecting refugees under the 
bilateral arrangements, it will likely remain 
insufficient for an important period of time.
UNHCR officials visiting the processing 
centre on Manus Island in June 2013 observed 
assessment interviews by the PNG Immigration 
and Citizenship Services Authority (PNGICSA). 
They reported that the PNG officials were ‘rigidly 
directed by use of a detailed template and script, 
leaving little scope for capture of information 
relating to individual circumstances of the applicant 
in his country of origin, or protection problems 
experienced in transit countries’ (UNHCR 
2013a). During a follow-up visit to the processing 
centre in October 2013, UNHCR officials noted 
that due to the particular complexities of their 
countries of origin, asylum seekers were ‘likely 
to present very complex cases requiring a high 
level of skill, experience and expertise by decision 
makers’ and doubted that PNGICSA officers 
could undertake adequate determinations without 
ongoing mentoring and adequate quality oversight 
(UNHCR 2013d). UNHCR officials observed 
two or three PNG refugee status determination 
officials conducting status determination interviews 
mentored by one experienced Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection official for 
more than 1100 asylum seekers (UNHCR 2013d). 
(On 30 May 2014, there were 1230 asylum seekers 
detained in the processing centre on Manus Island 
(ACBPS 2014).)
In May 2014, Minister Pato announced that an 
undisclosed number of asylum seekers had received 
initial assessments of their refugee status, and that a 
‘review process’ existed for those who had received 
negative determinations (Cochrane 2014c). The 
PNG Government had earlier stated its intention to 
establish an independent review panel comprised 
of an officer from the Department of Justice and 
an officer from the Attorney General’s Department 
(UNHCR 2013d). Whether these members have 
experience, expertise and knowledge in refugee 
law has not been revealed. The background of 
review panel members aside, the review process 
should accord UNHCR’s procedural standards in 
order to satisfy PNG and Australia’s obligations 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention. For example, 
every rejected applicant should be informed of the 
right to appeal a negative decision and the relevant 
procedures, and the reasons for the rejection in 
order to allow them to decide whether to appeal 
or not, and to focus their submissions on issues 
that are relevant to the appeal application. And the 
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appeal should be decided by an immigration officer 
who has equivalent or greater experience with 
refugee status determination than the officer who 
decided the original claim (UNHCR n.d.).
Resettlement in PNG
According to the terms of the 2013 Arrangement, 
those asylum seekers determined to be refugees 
will be offered resettlement in PNG. Disagreement 
in relation to the question of resettlement in PNG 
existed from the time of inception of the 2013 
Arrangement until the first announcement of 
decisions about status determination. Initially, 
Prime Minister O’Neill was reported as saying 
there was ‘no agreement that all genuine refugees 
will be settled in PNG’ and ‘We will take what we 
think we are able to assist, but we are also aware 
that we have our own issues with refugees from 
West Papua’ (Australia Network News 2013). 
In February 2014, Minister Pato explained to 
the parliament that PNG officials had started 
processing refugee applications, but as PNG did 
not have a visa category for refugees, third country 
resettlement of refugees would be explored by an 
expert panel (Cochrane 2014a). In May 2014, at the 
time of announcing the first status determination 
decisions, Minister Pato announced that cabinet’s 
expert panel may determine resettlement to 
be selective, based on a quota, or on the skills 
background of the person (Cochrane 2014c). 
Selective resettlement is not in accordance with the 
2013 Arrangement, and the resettlement options 
for those asylum seekers determined to be refugees 
but not subsequently permitted to resettle in PNG 
had not been elaborated at the time of publication 
of this paper.
The following section shifts from who 
might be resettled, to how resettlement might 
be implemented. Under the 2013 Arrangement, 
all resettlement costs incurred are to be met by 
Australia, while AUD26 million additional support 
for Manus Province is to extend Australia’s existing 
support under the Partnership for Development 
to Manus Province (approximately AUD14 
million over 2012–15) (DFAT 2014). While the 
details of Australian Government support for 
resettlement have not been substantiated, the 
intent is critically important given PNG’s current 
‘low human development’ ranking by the United 
Nations Development Programme in 2012 (156 
out of 186 countries), measured in terms of life 
expectancy, access to knowledge via mean years 
of schooling, and standard of living measured by 
gross national income (UNDP 2013a). PNG is also 
ranked 156 out of 186 countries for gender-based 
inequality measured in terms of maternal mortality 
and adolescent fertility rates, parliamentary 
participation and secondary and higher 
education rates, and labour market participation 
(UNDP 2013b).
Resettlement is a process, and a state of ‘being 
settled’ is enabled both by material support, and a 
positive community reception. In 2010, the United 
Nations Office for the High Commissioner for 
Refugees commented on the reception in PNG of 
asylum seekers who are not Melanesian:
Crime in PNG is frequent and largely violent, 
usually committed by gangs and often 
directed at foreigners. Persons of concern, 
unlike most expatriates in PNG, cannot afford 
additional security. Non-Melanesian asylum-
seekers and refugees in PNG are particularly 
vulnerable to xenophobia and racism amongst 
the local population.
Non-Melanesian refugees are perceived to 
be foreigners and are unlikely to integrate 
into local society or overcome the obstacles 
they face preventing their legal integration 
(e.g. access to the labour market). West 
Papuan refugees are seen as part of a wider 
Melanesian ethnic group because of strong 
kinship and are, therefore, better accepted 
by the local population. Non-Melanesian 
refugees are more likely to be marginalized 
and unable to access formal or informal 
protection systems, especially in the 
Highlands and in Port Moresby. (UNHCR 
2010, p. 5)
Australia is aware of ‘serious law and order 
problems’ in PNG, and the factors that DFAT 
claims generate insecurity in PNG (poverty, 
unemployment, poor governance) are the same 
priorities directing Australian aid to PNG.
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In considering resettlement of non-Melanesian 
refugees in PNG, UNHCR’s unsubstantiated 
reference to xenophobia can be taken up further. 
Xenophobia has been described as an increasingly 
global phenomenon in the instance of South–
South movement of migrants and refugees. 
Crush and Ramachandran’s (2009) report to 
the United Nations Development Program on 
the relation between xenophobia, international 
migration and human development, describes 
a pattern where people of ‘irregular’ status are 
vulnerable to victimisation due to their lack of 
status in the received state, and discrimination 
can lead to marked inequalities in the long term 
between migrant and non-migrant populations. 
These authors advise that the prevalence and 
manifestation of xenophobia can be measured and 
understood through qualitative and quantitative 
research that allows for the development of 
evidence-based counter strategies. For example, 
attitudes of nationals towards asylum seekers 
and refugees elicited through qualitative and 
quantitative survey work; attitudes of political 
parties manifest in legislative debate and published 
manifestos; media depiction of migrants and 
refugees; and existing tolerance towards ‘ethnic 
minorities’ (2009:5).
At the time of the announcement of the 
initial status determination decisions, National 
Capital District Governor Powes Parkop paid for 
a full-page advertisement in local newspapers in 
the form of an open letter to PNG Immigration 
Minister Pato. In the letter, Parkop proposed broad 
opposition to settlement in PNG to be influenced 
by the perception that some asylum seekers 
might be extremist Muslims (Cochrane 2014b). 
While the Australian Department of Border 
Protection and Immigration does not disclose data 
on the breakdown of the religious background 
of asylum seekers, it can be projected from the 
nationalities listed that a significant number of 
asylum seekers subject to transfer to PNG are 
Muslim. Flower (2012a) has estimated that if 
the current rate of conversion growth continues, 
the Muslim population of PNG (5000 in 2012) 
will barely exceed 10,000 by 2020, but settlement 
of ‘a larger active population of born Muslims’ 
through the 2013 Arrangement could facilitate 
further conversions (Flower in Chandler 2013).12 
Reflecting a global phenomenon, anti-Muslim 
rhetoric and violence in PNG has increased since 
9/11. Acts of violence target indigenous Muslims, 
repeated calls to ‘ban Islam’ are made by churches 
and politicians alike, and formation of Islamic 
centres and schools are protested (Flower 2012b). 
How can intercommunity tensions be minimised 
in the process of resettling refugees in PNG, and 
especially refugees who are Muslim?
De Renzio’s (2000) review of literature on 
intercommunity ties in PNG is useful here. He says 
that processes of trade, urbanisation and nation-
building have lessened barriers to intercommunity 
ties that were generated by geographical cleavages 
which separated social systems, differences in 
customs, and fear of warring tribes and sorcery 
(Simet and Iamo 1992 in de Renzio). Affiliation 
based on shared place of origin, ethnicity and 
language remains an important factor influencing 
social behaviour, particularly in urban areas of 
PNG. This affiliation produces a support network 
(Monsell-Davis 1993 in de Renzio) which functions 
to supplement ‘very meagre publicly-provided 
social security and social welfare mechanisms’ (de 
Renzio 2000). However, intercommunity solidarity 
might be generated, and tensions reduced, through 
the work of ‘bridging’ organisations that are 
characterised by horizontal ties which cut across 
kinship lines and wider social networks — for 
example, sports clubs, church groups, women’s 
and youth organisations, trade unions and other 
non-governmental organisations (ibid.). Where 
organisations characterised by horizontal ties are 
‘scaled up’, they may ‘overcome locally confined 
solidarities, gain bargaining power and access wider 
information networks’ (Fox 1996 in de Renzio).
This section has outlined PNG’s obligations 
under the terms of the 2013 Arrangement, and 
raised several capacity-related issues in relation 
to status determination and review processes, 
and social planning for resettlement. While the 
arrangement is subject to annual review by the 
Australia–PNG Ministerial Forum, its sustainability 
may be affected by several domestic issues, namely, 
legal challenges and security issues.
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Sustainability of the 2013 Arrangement
Opposition leader Belden Namah has claimed 
the transfer, processing and possible resettlement 
of asylum seekers in PNG to be unconstitutional 
(Australian 2013b). Following dismissal of an initial 
challenge in the Supreme Court, he filed a further 
challenge claiming that the arrangement did not 
accord with section 42 of the PNG Constitution, 
which states that all persons, whether citizens 
or not, have personal liberties in PNG and that 
the personal liberties of foreigners can only be 
restricted or restrained by the government if they 
enter the country illegally. It has been argued that 
asylum seekers transferred to PNG under the terms 
of the arrangement have not consented to enter 
PNG, and have not therefore broken any PNG laws 
allowing for their detention and the restriction of 
their personal liberties (e.g., ToKunai 2013). On 
29 January 2014, the Supreme Court found that 
Belden Namah did have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Manus processing centre.
The same bench of the Supreme Court also 
ruled that asylum seekers had a right under the 
PNG Constitution to apply to PNG courts for 
alleged human rights abuses. The Supreme Court 
said that asylum seekers could make a complaint 
to the National Court under section 42(5), or file 
a human rights enforcement application under 
section 57 to enforce their rights, including rights 
under section 42 of the PNG Constitution. The 
court reminded the public that the Human Rights 
Rules 2010 — part of National Court Rules — were 
made to simplify applications for alleged human 
rights abuses. The court commented: ‘As easy as 
the Human Rights Rules make it to commence 
section 57 proceedings, we take judicial notice of 
the fact that none have been commenced, either by 
the transferees presently being accommodated at 
the regional processing centre in Manus or by any 
other person or body on their behalf.’ The court 
further commented that the two constitutional 
offices of Public Solicitor and Ombudsman 
Commission should be taking the lead in the 
protection and enforcement of human rights 
in Papua New Guinea (Islands Business 2014). 
The Supreme Court judgement may provide the 
impetus for other activity by human rights groups 
on behalf of those detained on Manus.
Local members of parliament and customary 
landowner groups on Manus Island have made 
various protests in relation to the processing 
centre. It was reported that the PNG Government 
placed a ban on international media coverage of 
the 2013 Arrangement in order to carry out local 
consultation without external influence (Rooney 
2013). Since construction work on the new 
facility began, local members of parliament and 
customary landowner groups have protested the 
management of the site: construction contracts have 
been sourced outside Manus; and compensation 
is claimed for use of a dumpsite and gravel pits, 
anchorage and waste management of Australian 
ships, and sewage disposal. Significantly, islanders 
reported damage to the sago palm, the source of 
their staple food, with garbage generating black 
fly infestation. Landowners have already protested 
by blocking access to dumps and gravel pits in 
August, and threatening to shut down water 
supplies (Australian 2013a). Tensions are inevitable 
where interactions take place between customary 
landowning groups and the state or corporations on 
the issue of the use of natural resources. This was 
demonstrated at East Awin, and is currently being 
played out on Manus Island. Detaining asylum 
seekers and resettling refugees in PNG where most 
landholding is customary, and not commoditised, 
must be conceived from the point of view of 
customary landholders.
Security concerns pose another threat to 
the 2013 Arrangement. A demonstration that 
‘flared’ in the processing centre on Manus on 
17 February 2014 resulted in 77 asylum seekers 
treated for injuries, mainly head injuries, and 
the death of one asylum seeker (DIBP 2014). In 
late February, UK-listed security firm G4S were 
replaced by Transfield, which will subcontract 
security on Manus to Wilson Security, as it does 
on Nauru (Butler 2014). The Australian ‘Cornall 
review’ released in May 2014 found that tensions 
had become aggravated by antagonism between 
some asylum seekers, and some PNG nationals 
employed at the centre and their supporters in the 
local community, and that a ‘major task’ existed to 
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rebuild trust (Rushton 2014). PNG deputy police 
commissioner Simon Kauba issued a statement 
directly contradicting the findings of the Cornall 
review related to the involvement of PNG police 
(Wroe 2014).
Amnesty International (2013) have flagged two 
effects of insecurity within the processing centre on 
Manus. First, asylum seekers reported heightened 
anxiety about resettlement following experiences of 
confrontation, and second, concerns about security 
in the event of resettlement in PNG may compel 
some asylum seekers to return to their country of 
origin in spite of the risks faced there, effecting a 
‘constructive refoulement’ and thereby violating 
the principle of non-refoulement.13 From the 
commencement of Operation Sovereign Borders on 
18 September 2013 until 30 May 2014, 264 asylum 
seekers from offshore processing centres, including 
Manus Island, were reported as ‘voluntarily’ 
returning to their country of origin (ACBPS 2014).
Conclusion
Asylum policy in PNG and Australia underwent 
two major shifts in 2012–13 generated by 
memoranda of understanding between the 
governments of PNG and Australia. While the 
2012 Regional Processing Act provided for the 
assessment of asylum seekers by PNG, it was the 
August 2013 Regional Resettlement Arrangement 
that provided for the resettlement in PNG of 
asylum seekers determined to be refugees. 
While PNG has a track record related to the 
assessment and resettlement of non-Melanesian 
asylum seekers, this paper has argued that the 
particularities of West Papuans, specifically, their 
kin relations with Papua New Guineans, and 
their recognition prima facie as refugees, did 
not necessitate any capacity building relevant for 
carrying out assessment, review, or resettlement 
under the terms of the 2013 Arrangement. In fact, 
PNG’s track record, specifically, administration 
of the permissive resident permit system for West 
Papuans, reflected poorly on PNG’s capacity to 
fulfil its obligations at the time of inception of 
the Arrangement.
Under the 2013 Arrangement, refugee status 
determination is to be managed and administered 
by PNG, under domestic law, with support from 
Australia. The announcement in May 2014 by 
Minister Pato that an undisclosed number of 
asylum seekers had received initial assessments 
of their refugee status, and that a ‘review process’ 
existed for those who had received negative 
determinations, gives rise to two points. First, while 
status determinations have begun to be made, 
it cannot be assumed that the process reflects 
procedural fairness. UNHCR officials have advised 
that given their countries of origin, asylum seekers 
on Manus Island are likely to present complex cases 
that require expertise by decision makers. The 
capacity and integrity of the PNG Department of 
Immigration in the area of status determination 
and decision making must continue to be built 
through mentoring and adequate quality oversight 
by experienced Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection officers. In relation to the 
establishment of an independent review panel, 
adoption of a review process should accord 
UNHCR’s procedural standards in order to satisfy 
PNG and Australia’s obligations under the 1951 
Refugee Convention.
At the time of announcing these initial 
determination decisions, Minister Pato indicated 
that cabinet’s expert panel may determine 
resettlement to be selective, based on a quota, or 
on the skills background of the person. Selective 
resettlement does not accord with the 2013 
Arrangement. But the other point to be made about 
resettlement is intercommunity tension, which 
has already become evident on Manus Island. The 
importance of research-based social planning that 
will assist resettlement of refugees in the long term 
by minimising intercommunity tension cannot 
be overstated.
The final point relates to a positive effect 
of the 2013 Arrangement on the resettlement 
prospects of West Papuan refugees. Public discourse 
surrounding the arrangement has positioned West 
Papuans holding permissive residence permits 
as ‘fellow Melanesians’, deserving citizenship. 
Should Minister Pato act upon his publicly stated 
intention to remove the citizenship application 
fee for West Papuan refugees, the ambiguity over 
the legal status of West Papuans in PNG could be 
ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm                                                                                                 11 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2014/3
resolved. Enabling citizenship and the means for 
resettlement for West Papuan refugees is a positive, 
albeit incidental, effect of the 2013 Arrangement. 
It is also fair, given that the 2013 Arrangement 
compelled PNG to lift its reservations to the 1951 
Refugee Convention for asylum seekers transferred 
under that Arrangement only, and not for 
West Papuans.
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Endnotes
1 Diana Glazebrook undertook fieldwork among West 
Papuans at East Awin in 1998–99 towards a PhD in 
Anthropology (ANU). Her thesis was published as 
the monograph Permissive Residents by ANU E Press 
in 2008. In 2003–04, while a post-doctoral research 
fellow at the Centre for Cross-Cultural Research 
at the ANU, Diana did fieldwork in Dandenong, 
Melbourne, to look at the resettlement strategies of 
Hazara people released from detention on temporary 
protection visas, and in Iran, from where Hazara 
asylum seekers were making secondary movement 
to Australia. The transfer and possible resettlement 
in PNG of Hazara asylum seekers (and others) 
under the Regional Resettlement Arrangement has 
brought these two research themes together. Diana 
is executive editor of the Asia Pacific Journal of 
Anthropology at the ANU.
2 The ‘Regional Processing and Other Measures’ Act 
2012 can be viewed at <http://www.immi.gov.au/
legislation/amendments/2012/120818/lc18082012-01.
htm>, viewed 31/3/2014.
3 In the High Court of Australia the plaintiff is 
challenging the validity of section 198AB (‘Regional 
Processing Country’) of the Migration Act, claiming 
that the Commonwealth was not constitutionally 
empowered to remove a person to a third place 
where the conditions are ‘punitive’ (Case of Plaintiff 
S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection and Anor). <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/
cases/case_s156-2013>, viewed 1/4/2014.
4 The island of New Guinea is shared by the country 
of Papua New Guinea to the east, and to the west the 
‘Indonesian Province’ of Papua, previously known 
as Netherlands New Guinea (to 1962), West Irian 
(1962–73), and Irian Jaya (1973–2001). In 2001, 
the name Irian Jaya was changed to Papua and 
ratified through the Special Autonomy Bill for Papua 
(Basic Law number 21 of 2001) by the Indonesian 
Parliament in Jakarta. In this paper, people from the 
Indonesian Province of Papua living in PNG who 
have been categorised as refugees are referred to as 
‘West Papuan’ as this is their preferred term, and 
one that distinguishes them as a nation rather than 
a provincial Indonesian ethnicity. When referring to 
territory, I use ‘Indonesian Province’ of Papua and 
‘Irian Jaya’ depending on the period of reference. 
Both recognise the region’s administration as a 
province of the Indonesian Republic since 1969. 
Where West Papuans refer to their homeland, I follow 
their own use of ‘West Papua’.
5 Article 4 of the Basic Agreement between the 
Government of PNG and Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia on Border Arrangements, 
29 October 1984.
6 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees was later amended by the 1967 Protocol, 
which removed the geographical and time limits 
of the 1951 Convention. These documents define 
refugee status and entitlements (legal protection and 
other assistance) (UNHCR 2011).
7 Reservations are permitted at the time of ratification 
or accession, but may not be made to those provisions 
considered fundamental, including Article 1 
[definition of the term ‘refugee’], Article 3 [non-
discrimination], Article 4 [freedom of religion], 
Article 33 [non-refoulement] and Article 16(1) 
[access to the courts] (UNHCR 2011).
8 Nine of these settlements are inside PNG and two 
inside Papua but close to the border (ICJ-RCOA 
2003:paragraph 623).
9 Recent data related to East Awin has been 
provided by anthropologist Ian Bryson’s October 
2013 research for a social impact assessment for 
a petroleum development in the area (personal 
communication 2013).
10 1 PGK = 0.390977 AUD as at 1/04/2014.
11 The 1951 Convention defines a refugee ‘as a person 
who is outside his or her country of nationality or 
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habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted because of his or her race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling 
to avail him— or herself of the protection of that 
country, or to return there, for fear of persecution’ 
(Article 1A(2)) (UNHCR 2011), whereas an asylum 
seeker is a person whose claim to refugee status has 
not yet been definitively evaluated (UNHCR 2013b).
12 William Maley (personal communication October 
2013) makes an important qualification here: that 
asylum seekers from Afghanistan who are ethnic 
Hazara may have become secularised as a result of 
the influence of Maoist ideology, and even those 
who identify as Shi’a Muslim do not have a history of 
proselytisation due to the risk this would entail as a 
result of their minority status of Shi’a in Afghanistan.
13 The principle of non-refoulement contained in 
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention is considered its 
cornerstone. According to this principle, ‘a refugee 
should not be returned to a country where he or she 
faces serious threats to his or her life or freedom’ 
(UNHCR 2011).
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